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Abstract. A common requirement for modern distributed and reactive
systems is a high dependability guaranteeing reliability and security. The
rigorous analysis of dependable systems specications is of paramount
importance for the reliability and security of these systems. A two-layered
modal specication notation will allow the specication of services and
protocols for distributed dependable systems and their properties. Re-
nement and its dual { abstraction { will play the key roles in an inte-
grated development and analysis framework. Renement and abstraction
form the basis for an interference analysis method for security properties
and for automated test case generation.
1 Motivation
Current software engineering approaches are unlikely to deliver the level of de-
pendability required to construct future distributed, decentralised, and reactive
systems such as mobile systems, telecommunications management, communica-
tion and process control, or integrated e-business systems. The recent advent
of Internet and other intercommunications technologies has made one aspect of
properties particularly important: security properties.
We present a notation for the rigorous development and analysis of depend-
able systems properties. The specication of distributed systems is usually con-
cerned with properties such as reliability or fairness of the communication. In
dependable systems with high security requirements other properties are also
important. Condentiality describes that no condential data is disclosed to
unauthorised users. Integrity addresses unauthorised modication. Authentica-
tion describes that the identity of participants in a communication can be estab-
lished. We have dependable systems such as public key infrastructures (PKI) in
mind. PKIs are a combination of distributed systems and security technologies,
which create an ideal setting to discuss reliability and security issues.
A PKI provides an infrastructure for the management of public keys in cryp-
tographic systems [1]. It deals with entities, protocols and services in those sys-
tems. This includes for example services such as the generation, distribution and
storage of keys and other secrets. The central concept is that of a certicate. A
certicate is a datastructure that associates an identity to a public key by means
of a signature. This concept is used for encryption, signatures and key exchange.
The objectives are to guarantee condentiality, integrity and authentication.
We will analyse some aspects of PKIs, addressing services and protocols based
on these services. We will analyse these services and protocols with respect to
security issues such as condentiality, integrity, and authentication. The security
analysis is realised as an interference analysis, i.e., it is checked if an intruder
can interfere with the system and violate any of the security conditions. The
renement calculus [2, 3] forms the framework for the analysis. The analysis is
supported by systematic test case generation based on abstraction (abstraction
is dual to renement).
Modal logics, such as temporal or dynamic logics [4, 5], have shown their
ability to dene and reason about important properties of dependable systems,
such as safety and liveness, through special modal operators [6, 7, 8]. Dynamic
logic is suitable for the specication of nite aspects, which includes security
considerations. Dynamic logic is compositional, i.e., reasoning via structural in-
duction on commands is possible. We will argue that dynamic logic is a suitable
tool for security aspects in reactive and distributed systems specication. In
combination with a renement concept it allows the analysis of dependable sys-
tems in a novel way. Another advantage of dynamic logic is that it embraces
the classical pre/postcondition technique [9], which has become the foundation
of various engineering methods and notations such as design-by-contract [10] or
the Object Constraint Language OCL [11].
We propose renement of modal specications as the central concept for the
analysis of dependable systems. The renement relation can be used to develop
systems starting from a simple core, but also to integrate an adversary into
the specication in order to detect possible security aws in a system speci-
cation. Renement essentially guarantees property preservation. Assuming that
a property P holds for some specication of a system S, i.e., P (S), we expect
a rened specication S
0
to preserve that property, i.e., P (S) ) P (S
0
). Rene-
ment is a classical software engineering technique [2, 3] developed to support
transformational design and implementation, that has recently been deployed
in dening essential concepts for component technology [12, 13] and also for in-
terference analysis [14, 15]. Here, we will show a novel use of renement as an
analysis tool for detecting undesirable interferences and security violations. The
renement-based approach allows us to combine the traditional transformational
development with the unusual applications of interference analyses and test case
generation for the context of dependable systems.
We introduce our specication notation in Section 2. In subsections 2.3 and
2.4 we demonstrate the notation by specifying a protocol implementing an au-
thentication service. The principles of renement and abstraction are introduced
in Section 3. An analysis looking at an authentication service is carried out in
Section 4 for the protocol described in Section 2.3. Another form of analysis is
addressed in Section 5 focussing on condentiality and integrity in a key estab-
lishment and distribution service. We nish with related work and conclusions.
2 The Notation
The actors in communicating distributed systems are agents. Their activities are
usually described in terms of the following application-specic basic commands:
generate and remember data, establish and close connections, send and receive
messages, and guards to protect the execution of operations
1
. In this section, we
introduce the notation that we will use to specify and reason about dependability
properties. A command language can be based on the constructs listed above.
However, we will reduce this language for the sake of simplicity here.
2.1 The Command and Specication Languages
We dene the command primitives { send, receive and a test-operator { and
the command combinators informally, but we will give axiomatisations later on.
This process of conguring the language contributes to a better understanding
of the application and its problems. Flexibility in dening basic variations even
on this level is important for the analysis of security protocols.
{ snd
A!R
(M
1
; : : : ;M
n
): the send operation for agent A. R is the receiver, the
M
i
denote messages that are sent. The M
i
are local variables of the agent.
Their value s(M
i
) in the current state s is sent to R. The operation fails if
there is no variable M
i
dened or no communication takes place.
{ rcv
B S
(M
1
; : : : ;M
n
): the receive operation for agent B. S is sender and the
M
i
are messages arriving from S. The reception will only be carried out, if
data has been sent. The message data is assigned to local variables M
i
.
{ ?: the test is an operator that involves a quantier-free formula . The
semantics is to proceed if  is true, and fail otherwise.
We assume that messages are created and assigned to a variable before they are
sent. Received messages are assigned to variables, too.
Command combinators are dened inductively. Let c
1
, c
2
be command terms:
{ c
1
; c
2
(sequential composition): c
1
is followed by c
2
,
{ c
1
+ c
2
(non-deterministic choice): one possibility is chosen and executed,
{ c

1
(iteration): c
1
is iterated a non-deterministically chosen nite number of
times,
{ c
1
jc
2
(parallel composition): c
1
and c
2
are executed concurrently.
The parallel composition diers from the other command combinators in that
it is an operator involving two agents composed in parallel, whereas the others
can be combinations of commands of one or several agents. A send and a re-
ceive operation from two dierent agents can be synchronised. The two agents
communicate by synchronised message passing. On the receiving side, data is
assigned to a local name. The following is a parallel composition of two agents:
snd
A!B
(X); rcv
A B
(Y ) j rcv
B A
(Z); snd
B!A
(f(Z))
1
Later on, we will also consider cryptographic functionality.
An agent A sends a data item X to B and receives an answer Y from B. The
second agent B applies a function f to the received data Z item before sending
f(Z) back to A. Agent A receives f(Z) as Y .
The denitions of parallel composition and communication are critical for
our analysis. Our semantics allows two agents to communicate, i.e. allows a
send and a receive operation to be synchronised, if the types of the in- and
out-parameters coincide. Other notations for the specication of communication
such as the -calculus [16] also use dedicated channels between two agents.
Our specication language consists of two sublanguages: a command language
to express behaviour and a logical part to specify and reason about properties
of command executions. The language is based on dynamic logic [4] { a logic
with a notion of state that makes a command language explicit in the notation.
Modalities are indexed by programs, which are built from primitive commands
such as send and receive. Logical connectors such as conjunction, disjunction or
negation are available. There are also mixed operators { the modal operators {
combining commands and logical constructs, which make the language dierent
from classical rst-order logics. We introduce a box- and a diamond-operator for
safety and liveness properties, respectively. Let c be a command.
{ [c]: whenever c terminates, it must do so in a state satisfying .
{ hci: it is possible to execute c and terminate in a state satisfying .
If c is a simple state transition, e.g. a receive operation, then  ! [c]  and
! hci  are contracts for c with a precondition  and a postcondition  
2
. If c 
snd
A!B
(x)jrcv
B A
(y) is an interaction, then 
x
! [snd
A!B
(x)jrcv
B A
(y)]  
y
is a contract for the interaction saying that properties 
x
of an output variable
x are transferred to  
y
of an input variable y if the interaction takes place.
We can, for example, specify that an agent B remembers a message X that
has been received from A, but an intruder I should not be able to access X ,
Knows
A
(X)! [snd
A!B
(X) j rcv
B A
(X)] Knows
B
(X) ^ :Knows
I
(X)
using a predicate Knows. We might expect from a key exchange service { the
parallel execution of agents A and B { that a shared key is eventually in place.
Knows(key) is an invariant for the sender of key.
hAjBi Knows
A
(key) ^Knows
B
(key)
2.2 The Inference Framework
Formulas of our logical language are based on predicates. The equality predicate
t = t
0
is satised in a state of a semantic structure if the interpretations of terms
t and t
0
are equal. LetM be a semantic structure and s be a state. A satisfaction
2
The symbol ! stands for implication.
j= for the modalities can be dened as follows:
M; s j= [p] i every terminating computation of p starting in s
terminates in a state satisfying 
M; s j= hpi i exists a computation of p starting in state s
and terminating in a state that satises 
(1)
We could also dene one of the constructors in terms of the other: hpi := :[p]:
(or vice versa). With x
0
we denote the variable x in the previous state of a
command execution. This allows us to specify for example increment operations
[incr(x)] x = x
0
+1. In order to support the formal analysis of specied behaviour,
the operations { such as send and receive { shall be axiomatised in terms of the
given predicates, e.g., receive rcv
A B
for a given agent A:
[rcv
A B
(X)] Knows
A
(X) (2)
After receiving the message X from B, the agent A remembers (knows about)
X . An axiomatisation can be varied if the given application requires this. These
axioms express a developer's assumptions about the environment explicitly.
We can axiomatise the commands combinators:
hc
1
+ c
2
i, hc
1
i _ hc
2
i (3)
hc
1
; c
2
i, hc
1
ihc
2
i (4)
There are also dual formulations for the box-operator: [c
1
+ c
2
], [c
1
] ^ [c
2
]
and [c
1
; c
2
], [c
1
][c
2
]. In the literature (e.g. [4]), we typically nd axiomatisa-
tions of the test-operator such as h?i ,  ^  and [?] , ( !  ). Due to
our non-standard denition of the test-operator, these equivalences do not hold
here. There is no simple axiomatisation for the iteration t

; see [4] for axioms.
The parallel composition pjq of commands p and q of agents A and B, resp.,
makes our framework dierent from dynamic logic as presented in [4]. The se-
mantics of c
1
jc
2
is dened as a pair of component semantics ([[c
1
]]
A
; [[c
2
]]
B
) if
[[c
1
]]
A
and [[c
2
]]
B
are the semantics of c
1
and c
2
. The following axioms hold:
[c
1
jc
2
], [c
1
] ^ [c
2
] (5)
hc
1
jc
2
i, hc
1
i _ hc
2
i (6)
This corresponds to the axioms for the non-deterministic choice (3), except that
a choice between two commands is interpreted in one structure, whereas the
parallel composition is interpreted in two.
2.3 The Needham-Schroeder Protocol Specication
Public key infrastructures provide services such as key generation and distribu-
tion, or authentication. A number of these services are implemented by protocols.
The Needham-Schroeder protocol is a possible way to implement key exchange
and authentication [17]. It allows to bring a shared secret in place, assuming
that an encryption mechanism is already in place.
The Needham-Schroeder key exchange protocol is usually introduced using
the following informal notation:
A! B : fA;N
a
g
K
b
B ! A : fN
a
; N
b
g
K
a
A! B : fN
b
g
K
b
Two agents, A and B, attempt to share a secret. A starts by sending its own
identity and a randomly chosen number N
a
(called a nonce { number used once)
to B. A uses B's public encryption key K
b
to encrypt the message. B decrypts
the message with its own private decrypion key and sends the number sent by
A, N
a
, together with another nonce N
b
(created by B itself) back to A { again
using encryption, but now A's public key K
a
. Since A has used B's public key,
only B can decrypt the message. If A receives its nonce N
a
, it can be sure that
it has communicated with B. In order to allow B to also verify the authenticity
of A, A sends the nonce N
b
produced by B back to B. Two results should be
achieved: authenticity of the participants and condentiality of the nonces.
We reformulate the informal protocol specication using our command lan-
guage, before specifying properties. The specication shall be divided into ac-
tivities of agent A and agent B. Agent A acts as follows:
snd
A!B
(A;N
a
); rcv
A B
(N
a
; N
b
); snd
A!B
(N
b
) (7)
A sends a message to B, receives one from B, and sends a second message. The
data items received are stored in variables. Here is B's behaviour:
rcv
B A
(A;N
a
); snd
B!A
(N
a
; N
b
); rcv
B A
(N
b
) (8)
The authenticity of the agents A and B and the condentiality the nonces is not
guaranteed here. Encryption { to be added later { will achieve this.
2.4 Properties of the Needham-Schroeder Protocol
A dynamic logic specication consists of command terms and properties that
specify the commands in their behaviour. We can classify security properties
into authentication: authenticity of agents is guaranteed, condentiality: secret
data remains secret, and integrity: data remains intact. We use dierent forms
of constraints to address them:
{ Firstly, an access control constraint describes that a data item is accessible
for the receiver, e.g., that data actually arrives if it is sent. This allows us to
deal with condentiality and integrity.
{ An authentication constraint describes that after a sequence of message ex-
changes one agent is sure about the identity of another agent. This requires
the use of cryptographic methods.
{ The correctness constraint is a data-specic consistency condition, e.g., that
data, which has been sent, satises a certain condition.
Later, we add cryptographic constraints. If a message has been encrypted with a
public key, then the message can only be decrypted with the corresponding pri-
vate key. Authentication and condentiality can be achieved using cryptographic
methods, but, still, an intruder attack can violate all these properties.
The receive-operation of agent A in the Needham-Schroeder protocol shall
be specied by the following access control constraint:
[rcv
A B
(N
a
; N
b
)] Knows
A
(N
a
; N
b
) (9)
After receiving data, A remembers the information, i.e., stores it locally in vari-
ables N
a
and N
b
, expressed using the predicate Knows. Agent B receives two
messages. Each reception is remembered in the corresponding variables:
[rcv
B A
(A;N
a
)] Knows
B
(A;N
a
) (10)
[rcv
B A
(N
b
)] Knows
B
(N
b
) (11)
Previous assignments are overwritten, otherwise older assignments are remem-
bered. After discussing single protocol steps, we address the full behaviour of a
single agent. After nishing their execution sequences both agents shall share a
secret, or at least the same two values
3
. Here are agent A (12) and B (13):
[snd
A!B
(A;N
a
); rcv
A B
(N
a
; N
b
); snd
A!B
(N
b
)] Knows
A
(N
a
; N
b
) (12)
[rcv
B A
(A;N
a
); snd
B!A
(N
a
; N
b
); rcv
B A
(N
b
)] Knows
B
(N
a
; N
b
) (13)
An agent A authenticates another agent B, if A sends a random number N
a
to B encrypted with B's public key. If A receives N
0
a
back from B and N
a
= N
0
a
,
then A can be sure that only B { the owner of the public key K
B
{ could have
decrypted K
B
(N
a
) and sent N
a
back. We expect
[snd
A!B
(K
B
(N
A
)); rcv
A B
(K
A
(N
0
A
))] N
A
= N
0
A
(14)
for the authentication. We dene the authentication predicate Auth
A
(B) for
agent A and a target agent B to become true in that case.
Data sent or received is subjected to constraints in some cases. The rst send-
operation of agent A is not restricted with respect to a correctness constraint,
[snd
A!B
(A;N
a
)] true (15)
but A should receive its nonce N
a
back from B, i.e., the received value in N
a
is
the same as the value in the previous state N
0
a
:
[rcv
A B
(N
a
; N
b
)] N
a
= N
0
a
(16)
3
The fact that B also remembers the identity of A { see (10) { is not relevant at this
stage and therefore neglected.
A should only proceed if this is satised { expressed using a precondition:
N
a
= N
0
a
! [snd
A!B
(N
b
)] true (17)
The rst value that A receives must coincide with its own nonce N
a
. Similar
constraints can be imposed on agent B, e.g., on the second receive operation:
[rcv
B A
(N
b
)] N
b
= N
0
b
.
Access control, authentication, and correctness form dierent views on the
problem { e.g., the accessibility formula [rcv
A B
(N
a
; N
b
)] Knows
A
(N
a
; N
b
) and
the correctness condition rcv
A B
(N
a
; N
b
)] N
a
= N
0
a
can be combined to the
formula [rcv
A B
(N
a
; N
b
)] Knows
A
(N
a
; N
b
) ^N
a
= N
0
a
using inference rules of
the logic, see Section 2.2.
3 Renement and Abstraction
The two main concepts for our interference analysis shall now be introduced.
Traditionally, renement is used to develop a specication step by step. Rene-
ment also serves another purpose in our approach. Security analysis { intruder
integration and interference analysis { can also be supported. We use the concept
of abstraction { the dual of renement { to test for interferences. We will briey
show how to add encryption to a simplied protocol specication in order to
illustrate the transformational development approach based on renement. The
concepts for interference analysis and testing will be applied in Section 4.
3.1 Renement
The renement relation is essentially dened based on implication. A speci-
cation is a renement of another if it implies it, i.e., if the renement pre-
serves the properties of the original specication. Let  and  be formulas:
 renes  i  !  . For commands p and q specied by  ! [c] 
0
and
 ! [c
0
]  
0
we dene { based on the monotonicity of [ : ], see [4] Th. 4(2) { for
the box-operator:
c is rened by c
0
, or c v c
0
, i !  ^  
0
! 
0
(18)
We have chosen to dene a sucient and necessary condition. An intruder cannot
be introduced (using renement { see Section 4) that violates the renement, but
does not aect the security conditions of the original specication. A violation
of a renement should only occur if security specications are violated.
We do not constrain the commands c and c
0
in any way. This allows a single
command to be rened by a sequence of commands. We could also insert com-
mands into a sequence of commands without violating the renement condition.
The renement of commands is here dened on properties of the state that is
reached through command execution. More support for a renement calculus
can be based on an inference system for dynamic logic, see [4].
To add encryption to the protocol specication from Section 2.3 using rene-
ment, we dene two new functions for encryption and decryption and axiomatise
their behaviour. The particular encryption method (RSA, Merkle-Hellman, etc.
[18]) shall not matter. We assume that the encryption scheme is secure, i.e.,
that there are no principal problems such as mathematical aws. We assume a
public key encryption scheme. K
A
is A's (public) encryption key and K
 1
A
is its
(private) decryption key (analogously for B). K
A
(X) is the encryption operation
and K
 1
A
(Y ) the decryption operation
4
. The cryptographic law is:
K
 1
A
(K
A
(X)) = X (19)
In order to fully specify cryptographic basics, we would need to express that not
only can the original message be recovered with the corresponding private key,
but also that no other key except the corresponding private key can decrypt the
message. For the sake of simplicity, we have left out properties like this.
Each agent shall know the public keys of the agents it wants to communicate
with securely. In our case, for two agents A and B, the predicates Knows
A
(K
B
)
for A and Knows
B
(K
A
) for B are true. The specication of agent B, who
receives encrypted data from A, now looks as follows:
[rcv
A B
(X;Y )] Knows
B
(K
 1
B
(X;Y )) (20)
B tries to decrypt the received pair of two data items X and Y . B should only
proceed if the decryption is successful, i.e., results in K
 1
B
(X;Y ) = (A;N
a
).
[(K
 1
B
(X;Y ) = (A;N
a
))?; snd
B!A
(K
A
(N
a
; N
b
))] true (21)
Composed in parallel, A and B can communicate { the send and receive oper-
ation are synchronised and data is transferred from A to B. After applying the
axioms (5) and true ^ ,  to (15) and (10), the simplied specication
[snd
A!B
(A;N
a
) j rcv
B A
(A;N
a
)] Knows
B
(A;N
a
) (22)
can be rened by
[snd
A!B
(K
B
(A;N
a
)) j rcv
B A
(K
B
(A;N
a
))] Knows
B
(K
 1
B
(K
B
(A;N
a
)))
(23)
With the assumption that a cryptosystem is in place, we get Knows
B
(A;N
a
) =
Knows
B
(K
 1
B
(K
B
(A;N
a
))) by applying the cryptographic law (19). Thus, the
renement relation is satised. We have proved that properties from the original
specication (22) are actually preserved by (23).
3.2 Abstraction and Testing
The parallel composition of agents is the essential combinator for our interference
analysis. We can automate the analysis by testing the composition of sequential
4
This notation is not sucient for cryptographic techniques such as signatures. To
keep the notation simple for the given protocol form, we have used this simple form.
agent behaviours. Each sequential agent behaviour { called a scenario { is a
test case for a non-sequential, non-deterministic agent specication. Agents of
our ideal protocol have been dened in a sequential deterministic way, but we
assume a non-deterministic behaviour for the intruder. These scenarios shall be
constrained by the abstraction Spec w Scen, i.e., the system specication Spec
is abstracted by the scenario Scen, or, the specication renes the scenario. We
will systematically try to nd intruder scenarios that { in composition with the
protocol agents { violate the renement relation.
The basic principle of test case generation in the context of the renement
calculus is that test cases abstract contracts
5
. The abstraction is dual to the
renement relation. c abstracts c
0
{ or c
0
is abstracted by c { if c
0
renes c:
c
0
w c := c v c
0
^ c 6= false
for any two commands c and c
0
. false is the trivial abstraction, which should be
excluded. Specications can involve sequential, iterative and non-deterministic
behaviour. For an intruder, we cannot assume sequential or deterministic be-
haviour, but we will test the system using various sequential intruder scenarios.
The rst step shall be to dene a simple input/output test case for a com-
mand. A test case TC
c
for a command c is dened by:
TC
c
(; ) := ! [c] 
 and  are conditions describing input and output values. The following propo-
sition states when a pair of conditions  and  is a suitable test case for a
command, i.e., when it abstracts a command c specied by ! [c]  .
c w TC
c
(; ) , (! ) ^ ( ^  )!  (24)
An example shall illustrate this proposition. We assume the following denitions
for the conditions , ,  and  :   x  0,   y = x+1,   x = 1, and  
y = 2. Then, the two constraints formulated in the proposition are satised and
we have a proper test case: the condition !  is satised since x = 1! x  0,
and the condition ( ^  )!  is satised since (x = 1 ^ y = x+ 1)! y = 2.
In order to deal with interaction between agents of a protocol, we expand
our notion of test cases to interactions between two agents.
TC
c
1
jc
2
(
x
; 
y
) := 
x
! [c
1
hxijc
2
(y)] 
y
where 
x
and 
y
are properties of x and y, respectively. Properties of x are
transferred to y if the interaction takes place. A test case for parallel compositions
requires x and y to have the same type.
c
1
jc
2
w TC
c
1
jc
2
(
x
; 
y
) , 
x
! 
y
(25)
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Most of the concepts here are motivated by [19], but formulated in a dierent se-
mantical framework and extended to parallel composition.
The key construct to test concurrent non-deterministic agents is a scenario, i.e.,
a sequence of basic commands or interactions of basic commands. We dene
a scenario S for a specication as a sequence (c
1
; : : : ; c
n
) of basic commands
or interactions of basic commands. We assume an iterative non-deterministic
choice to be the basic format of an intruder specication, see also (31). Scenarios
abstract iterative choices (c
1
+ : : :+ c
n
)

if the scenario itself is executable, i.e.,
if the last state of the sequence can be reached.
Let c
i
be specied by 
i
! [c
i
]  
i
and assume  
i
k
6= false (the last state
should be reachable). Then
(c
1
+ : : :+ c
n
)

w (c
i
1
; : : : ; c
i
k
) if  
i
j
! 
i
j+1
(26)
with 1  i
j
 n (j = 1; ::; k) and 
i
j
! [c
i
j
]  
i
j
and 
i
j+1
being the precondition
of the (j + 1)-th element in the scenario sequence.
The next two propositions are corollaries based on the last proposition. They
essentially state how to construct scenarios for specications. The rst one shows
conditions that makes a basic scenario a test case for an iterative choice. Let
p ^ 
i
! [c
i
]  
i
and 
j
! [c
j
]  
j
. If p 6= false and  
i
! 
j
then
(c
1
+ : : :+ c
n
)

w (c
i
; c
j
) (27)
for i; j 2 1; ::; n. The next corollary shows how to combine basic scenarios into
more complex ones. Let c
a
^
a
! [c
a
]  
a
, a 2 fi; j; kg. If (c
1
+ : : :+ c
n
)

w c
i
; c
j
and (c
1
+ : : :+ c
n
)

w c
j
; c
k
and c
i
6= false and  
i
! c
i
^
j
and c
i
6= false and
 
i
! c
j
^ 
j
then
(c
1
+ : : :+ c
n
)

w (c
i
; c
j
; c
k
) (28)
4 Authentication Analysis
A central PKI service is authentication support through certicates. Therefore,
our rst analysis addresses a protocol implementing an authentication service.
Security analysis is mostly concerned with safety properties, i.e., something
(bad) must never happen (e.g., that the intruder knows a secret { at any time),
whereas the development of protocols is more involved with liveness properties,
i.e., that something (good) will happen eventually (data arrives, keys are even-
tually in place). Our dynamic logic provides constructs for both aspects.
We will base our analysis on an accepted and successful methodology { used
by most analysis techniques [8, 20, 21]: formal specication of the ideal be-
haviour, add the intruder or possible interfering features, state the properties
to be guaranteed/analysed, analyse the ideal specication, and vary parameters
and analyse again. This justies to use renement to add the adversary or new
features, but also to vary parameters through repeated use of renement.
4.1 The Protocol
The full specication of the desired behaviour of the Needham-Schroeder pro-
tocol with respect to authentication based on the specications of A and B in
isolation, (12) and (13), is:
[snd
A!B
(K
B
(A;N
a
)); rcv
A B
(K
A
(N
a
; N
b
)); snd
A!B
(K
B
(N
b
)) j
rcv
B A
(K
B
(A;N
a
)); snd
B!A
(K
A
(N
a
; N
b
)); rcv
B A
(K
B
(N
b
))]
Auth
A
(B) ^Auth
B
(A)
(29)
This is the ideal protocol. Any intruder behaviour will be analysed against this
specication. The agents themselves behave deterministically, thus we have used
the box operator. When the intruder I is integrated, behaviour becomes non-
deterministic. The intruder might intercept at any time. Still, we would like to
guarantee that A and B eventually authenticate each other, even under inter-
ference by an intruder:
hAjBjIi Auth
A
(B) ^ Auth
B
(A) (30)
We want to prevent that an intruder can interfere with the authentication be-
tween A and B. A mutual authentication between A and B shall be achieved.
This is an adaptation of Goguen and Meseguer's classical non-interference de-
nition. Here, an intruder does not interfere with another group of agents, if the
excution of intruder commands has no eect on the agent's security properties.
4.2 The Adversary
We assume intruders to have capabilities as formulated in the Dolev-Yao model
[22]. The Dolev-Yao model is an accepted collection of assumptions about possi-
ble intruder behaviour. The intruder can read any message, block further trans-
mission, decompose messages, remember messages, generate fresh data, and com-
pose and send new messages
6
. In principle, the intruder can non-deterministically
choose between these operations. The general diculty with these analyses is to
make the right assumptions about the intruder (or about new features in feature
interaction analysis) in order to detect possible interferences. This problem can
only be solved by the developer or analyser, but the specication and analysis
technique should provide the possibility to vary assumptions explicitly.
The mechanism for an intruder to attack a protocol is to intercept the commu-
nication between the agents participating in the protocol. This can be modelled
by allowing the intruder to be executed in parallel with the agents. Then, the
intruder I can communicate with the agents A and B, receiving and sending mes-
sages. LetA := snd
A!B
(y),B := rcv
B A
(y) and I := rcv
I A
(y); snd
I!B
(f(y)).
The parallel composition of A, B and intruder I , AjBjI , can result in one of the
following executions based on synchronisations of non-deterministically chosen
send- and receive-operations. A and B can communicate directly by transferring
data from A to B, or A communicates rst with I and then I communicates with
B sending manipulated data f(y) to B. The rst is the desired case, the second
is a successful intrusion, or interference, using a man-in-the-middle attack.
6
This does not include the intruder's encryption capabilities.
Reducing the capabilities of the intruder to two operations here, the general
behaviour of an intruder is:
(snd
I!X
(M
1
; : : : ;M
n
) + rcv
I Y
(M
1
; : : : ;M
m
))

(31)
The intruder chooses repeatedly and non-deterministically between sending and
receiving { we cannot make many assumptions about an intruder's behaviour.
We assume that the intruder does not block communication between A and B.
4.3 The Analysis
In a concrete example, the intruder may execute the following command sequence
rcv
I A
(K
I
(A;N
a
)); snd
I!B
(K
B
(A;N
a
));
rcv
I B
(K
A
(N
a
; N
b
)); snd
I!A
(K
A
(N
a
; N
b
))
(32)
which satises (31). The intruder intercepts the communication between A and
B. At the beginning, the intruder has to convince A to communicate with him
instead of B, i.e., A needs to send data to him and to use his public encryption
key. The intruder then forwards this to B imposturing as A, and B's answer
to A is again intercepted and forwarded to A. A and B might not suspect an
intrusion. In this scenario, A authenticates I , since A uses I 's public key and
receives N
A
back. B authenticates A since N
B
encrypted with A's public key is
returned. This is where the protocol fails to work securelyfootnoteThis attack
has originally been described in [23]..
The intruder can be integrated via renement. The ideal protocol specica-
tion, which species the expected secure behaviour, should be preserved. The
inclusion of a successful intruder would violate the ideal specication, i.e., would
not rene the ideal protocol specication. For instance, the condentiality con-
straint could be violated by the intruder behaviour. Renement is the tool to
analyse, i.e., to prove or disprove, the security of a protocol. We would hope to
prove that all possible extensions by intruder behaviours are renements that
preserve the properties specied for the protocol. Then, the protocol is secure.
The essential properties have already been discussed. Eventually the agents
A and B have authenticated each other: Auth
A
(B) ^ Auth
B
(A). Including the
intruder I as specied above in formula (32) will satisfy
hAjBjIi Auth
A
(I) ^Auth
B
(A) (33)
since the intruder intercepts the communication and is able to imposture as A for
B, but this clearly violates the protocol specication (30) { hAjBjIi Auth
A
(B)^
Auth
B
(A) { which requires that A and B mutually authenticate each other. Seen
as a renement step, we get a violation of the constraint: the predicate Auth
A
(I)
does obviously not imply Auth
A
(B). Besides being used for the stepwise devel-
opment, renement is also a tool for analysis { even though our aim now is to
violate the renement constraint in order to detect security aws.
4.4 Testing
The testing concepts shall now be applied to the authentication analysis of the
Needham-Schroeder protocol. Firstly, we would need to summarise the contracts
of the basic commands such as [snd
A!B
(K
B
(N
A
)); rcv
A B
(K
A
(N
A
))] Auth
A
(B)
or [snd
A!B
(A;N
a
)] true. Then, we list the possible interactions between the two
agents of the ideal protocol in (34) and also some of the possible interactions
between the two agents and the intruder for the extended protocol in (35).

1
:= snd
A!B
(A;N
a
) j rcv
B A
(A;N
a
)

2
:= rcv
A B
(N
a
; N
b
) j snd
B!A
(N
a
; N
b
)

3
:= snd
A!B
(N
b
) j rcv
B A
(N
b
)
(34)
A variety of interactions is possible if the non-deterministic intruder is included.
A few of them are:

4
:= snd
A!B
(A;N
a
) j rcv
I A
(A;N
a
)

5
:= snd
I!B
(I;N
a
) j rcv
B I
(I;N
a
)

6
:= rcv
I B
(N
a
; N
b
) j snd
B!I
(N
a
; N
b
)

7
:= rcv
A I
(N
a
; N
b
) j snd
I!A
(N
a
; N
b
)

8
:= snd
A!B
(N
b
) j rcv
I A
(N
b
)

9
:= snd
I!B
(N
b
) j rcv
B I
(N
b
)
(35)
The interactions 
4
; : : : ; 
9
describe a successful intrusion that leads to the de-
scribed authentication problem { see (32) in Section 4.3. Interactions are the
basis of the scenario generation. Interactions are sequentially composed to sim-
ple scenarios in the rst step. Simple two-element scenarios are (
4
; 
5
), (
5
; 
6
),
: : :, (
8
; 
9
). These simple scenarios are derived using proposition (27). The simple
scenarios are combined to full scenarios based on proposition (28), e.g.,
(
4
) := 
4
(
5
) := 
4
; 
5
(
6
) := 
4
; 
5
; 
6
(36)
Finally, we can show that the scenario (
9
) := 
4
; : : : ; 
9
is an abstraction of the
protocol including the intruder.
AjBjI w 
4
; : : : ; 
9
(37)
We can derive the intruder behaviour for this scenario by projecting onto the
intruder in the overall sequence of interactions. This sequence is clearly an ab-
straction of the general intruder behaviour:
(snd
I!X
(M
1
) + rcv
I Y
(M
2
))

w
rcv
I A
(A;N
a
); snd
I!B
(I;N
a
); rcv
I B
(N
a
; N
b
);
snd
I!A
(N
a
; N
b
); rcv
I A
(N
b
); snd
I!B
(N
b
)
(38)
The inclusion of the intruder does not satisfy the constraint that A and B
mutually authenticate each other, see (30). A security aw is detected.
5 Condentiality and Integrity Analysis
Besides authentication support, a PKI also provides services concerned with the
secure distribution of keys and other secrets. In order to show the versatility of
our method, we shall look at condentiality and integrity issues relating to a key
establishment service based on a simplied Die-Hellman protocol [18].
5.1 The Protocol
The protocol assumes a common number g. The names a and b denote random
values generated by A and B, respectively.
snd
A!B
(g
a
); rcv
A B
(g
b
) (39)
A sends g
a
to B, and receives g
b
from B. Here is B:
rcv
B A
(g
a
); snd
B!A
(g
b
) (40)
Here are the access control properties concerning A and B:
[snd
A!B
(g
a
); rcv
A B
(g
b
)] Knows
A
(a; b)
[rcv
B A
(g
a
); snd
B!A
(g
b
)] Knows
B
(a; b)
(41)
Thus, we get for the ideal protocol { the parallel composition:
[snd
A!B
(g
a
); rcv
A B
(g
b
) j rcv
B A
(g
a
); snd
B!A
(g
b
)]
Knows
A
(a; b) ^Knows
B
(a; b)
(42)
Two values are exchanged. A knows value b of B, and B knows value a of A. This
is the full specication of the desired behaviour { the protocol without intruder
{ based on the specications of A and B in isolation, (41). Including intruder I
[AjBjI ] :Knows
I
(a; b) (43)
we would not like I to interfere, but would like to achieve
hAjBjIi Knows
A
(a; b) ^Knows
B
(a; b) : (44)
We want to prevent that an intruder will ever get hold on the secret (a safety
condition) and that A and B will eventually share a secret (a liveness condition).
5.2 The Adversary
We reduce the capabilities of the intruder to the send- and receive-operations:
(snd
I!X
(M
1
; : : : ;M
n
) + rcv
I Y
(M
1
; : : : ;M
m
))

. The intruder may proceed as
specied by the following command sequence:
rcv
I A
(g
a
); snd
I!B
(g
a
); rcv
I B
(g
b
); snd
I!A
(g
b
) (45)
The intruder intercepts the communication between A and B. He will know
about the secret shared between A and B { the values g
a
and g
b
{ and he will
even about a and b if he knows g or can infer it.
5.3 The Analysis
The intruder is again integrated via renement. A successful intruder inclusion
would violate the security conditions of the ideal specication, i.e., would not
rene the ideal protocol specication. We hope that eventually secrets a and b are
in place and nobody else knows about them, i.e., Knows
A
(a; b)^Knows
B
(a; b)
and :Knows
I
(a; b) for any other agent I . Including the intruder I as specied
above in formula (45) and assuming that I can infer g will satisfy
[AjBjI ] Knows
I
(a; b) (46)
since the intruder intercepts the communication and has access to g
a
and g
b
and can calculate a and b from them, but it also violates the specication
[AjBjI ] :Knows
I
(a; b), see (43). Assuming that I knows g, we get again a viola-
tion of the renement constraint: Knows
I
(a; b) does not imply :Knows
I
(a; b).
6 Related Work
Most approaches to security systems analysis are essentially adaptations of gen-
eral frameworks to the security context. Durgin and Mitchell [8] use conventional
logics and analysis methods to analyse security protocols. Their specication ap-
proach is based on multisets of rst-order formulas (called facts). A rewriting
technique is used to develop and analyse specications. State are described by
multisets of facts. State transitions are given by rules, essentially relations on
multisets of facts. This treatment of states and state transitions is the essential
dierence between their approach and our framework. We believe that a for-
mal specication framework closer to techniques such as pre/postconditions and
renement is more suitable for a general approach to dependable systems engi-
neering. Common characteristics include the aim to reduce implicit assumptions
and to make them explicit, and the use of the explicit intruder method.
The spi-calculus [20] is based on the -calculus and includes additional cryp-
tographic primitives. Process calculi such as the -calculus are suitable to model
and develop infrastructures for distributed and mobile systems. The key dier-
ence to our approach is that the intruder behaviour is not modelled explicitly in
the spi-calculus. Security properties of process denitions such as condentiality
(secrecy) and authentication (essentially integrity) are expressed via equivalences
to a process specication. Consider the following example. Two processes shall
be dened: a process A sending a message M on channel c
AB
and a process
B := c
AB
(x):F (x) receiving on c
AB
and then processing the input x. The pro-
tocol is the parallel composition of A and B, i.e., P = c
AB
:A(M)jB with a
channel c
AB
restricted to A and B. We expect B to processM internally, which
can be expressed by B
spec
:= c
AB
(x):F (M). The overall protocol specication
is P
spec
:= c
AB
:A(M)jB
spec
.
{ Secrecy: if F (M) ' F (M
0
) then P (M) ' P (M
0
) for allM;M
0
. Whatever the
message is, an observer cannot distinguish between messages. If B does not
leakM within F , then the protocol should not leakM in order to guarantee
secrecy.
{ Authentication (integrity): P (M) ' P
spec
(M) for all M . The protocol P
should behave (under observation) like its specication P
spec
, i.e., if M is
sent, then M arrives unchanged and is processed subsequently.
The equivalence ' is testing equivalence. It formalises the idea of observation
(by an intruder). Compared to our approach, the spi-calculus is more abstract.
It assumes restricted channels to be secure. Our approach does not make this
assumption. We oer the possibility of more ne-granular and explicit analyses.
Paulson's Inductive Method [21] uses induction over protocol traces (a trace
is a list of events that occur in some run of a protocol). Paulson introduces
a specialised notation for security protocols. Standard operators to construct,
deconstruct and remember messages are used in the specication of traces.
The overall set of traces describing a protocol is dened inductively. Focardi,
Ghelli and Gorrieri [24] apply a non-interference approach for the analysis of the
Needham-Schroeder protocol. To keep our approach suitable for all forms of de-
pendability aspects and integrated development and analysis, we have included
security-specic aspects into a general-purpose framework, providing exibility
and congurability by combining dierent command features.
Butler [25] describes an approach to security systems analysis similar to ours.
Butler bases his framework on a combination of the abstract machine notation
AMN (the B method) and CSP. He also uses renement to introduce the in-
truder. The correctness of an abstraction invariant AI needs to be checked:
S v
AI
T if AI ) [T ]hSiAI . Butler's approach is based on iterative renement,
i.e., an initial abstraction might need to be strengthened iteratively until suit-
able. Butler's and our approach are similar in that both use an explicit intruder
model and use renement to introduce encryption and the intruder. Both pro-
vide safety and liveness operators and make parallel composition available. The
key dierence is that Butler's approach is based on data renement with ex-
plicit state, whereas we use an implicit, observation-based notion of state, which
creates a more abstract framework. We think that developing our renements
results into renement laws giving templates for e.g. condentiality-preserving
renements is a more suitable way. The combination of CSP and FDR, a model
checking tool, has been been very fruitful for security analyses, e.g., to detect
Lowe's attack [23]. This work has been carried further; [26] is a recent example.
However, a proof-theoretic approach can give more insight into why a protocol
works or fails than model checking.
We see renement as an interference analysis tool, not restricted to security
analysis, but also suitable for other forms of interference detection. Feature in-
teraction in telephony systems poses a similar problem [14, 15]. If a new feature
has to be added to an existing system, the main question is whether there are
unexpected or undesirable interferences with existing features. Renement can
answer this question. The principle of our analysis method { state the ideal
properties, add new behaviour, and analyse possible interferences { is not lim-
ited to security analysis. In [15], an investigation into common simple telephone
systems and advanced features such as call waiting and call forwarding is carried
out. Certain properties (invariants) are proven for the specication of the basic
system. A rened specication including advanced features needs to preserve the
properties. There is an interference, if this is not possible. Feature interaction is
dened as the violation of proof obligations in a renement.
Our work is based on testing approaches developed in [27, 28, 29, 19]. We
have in particular based parts of our test case generation on ideas developed
by Aichernig in [19]. He presented his work in a general purpose context, with
semantics based on weakest preconditions { essentially based on [3]. We have
improved this semantic framework towards a more exible and expressive modal
logic framework. Additionally, we have provided an improved, process-algebra
style command language including an explicit parallel composition.
7 Conclusions
Our approach to integrated development and analysis of dependable systems is
based on a renement mechanism for both purposes. Using renement as an anal-
ysis tool is not restricted to security analyses where various intruder behaviours
can be analysed. The analysis of any kind of interference such as feature interac-
tion can be carried out. An essential technique for the analysis of interferences is
to vary the behaviour. Elements have to be added or removed in a exible way.
We have provided two ways to control this exibility: rstly, by using renement
to add new elements while preserving properties, and, secondly, by providing a
framework where the command language for the communication primitives itself
is not xed, but can be inuenced through the introduction and axiomatisation
of new commands (or variants of existing ones). This exibility in reecting dif-
ferent assumptions about the underlying technology and the intruder is crucial.
Another key element is the compositionality of the approach, which supports the
required exibility in modelling and analysing various scenarios through compo-
sition and decomposition.
Our main objective has been to illustrate the concepts needed to address
reliability and security problems in dependable systems engineering. Two dier-
ent aspects have been looked at to show the versatility of the approach. Here,
we have illustrated concepts using aspects from the well-known security pro-
tocols Needham-Schroeder and Die-Hellman. In [30], we have investigated a
specialised protocol { the Online Certicate Status Protocol OCSP. Due to the
compositionality of the dynamic logic framework, the approach is scalable and
can be applied to larger systems. We have addressed mechanised analysis support
through test case generation, necessary for large systems analysis. An approach
to further simplify reasoning, and enable automated or mechanised reasoning
in particular, is to reduce the complexity to equational reasoning by dening a
renement between modal formulas where the condition can be reduced to an
implication between simple non-modal formulas. Suitable environments for proof
support could be tools supporting pre- and postcondition based specication or
tools such as tools for the B specication language, which have also been used
in [25] and in the feature interaction analysis [15] discussed earlier on.
We have used abstraction-based testing to verify security properties. Since
we have used a dynamic logic similar to the modal -calculus [31], the question
arises whether model checking is another alternative. The modal -calculus is
a branching time temporal logic that forms the basis of several model checking
approaches, see [32]. With a nite state space and nite set of properties, model
checking becomes an alternative. If a given model satises the ideal protocol
specication, then the model also has to satisfy the protocol with intruder. Oth-
erwise, there is a security violation. In [30], we have given semantics to a similar
specication notation based on Kripke transition systems and the -calculus,
enabling model checking as an alternative approach to the automation of the
security analysis.
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